We determine the events that cause large shocks in volatility of the DJIA index over the period 1928-2013, using a new semi-parametric test based on conditional heteroscedasticity models. We find that these large shocks can be associated with particular events (financial crashes, elections, wars, monetary policies, . . . ). We show that some shocks are not identified as extraordinary movements by the investors due to their occurring during high volatility episodes, especially
Introduction
Black Monday, as October 19, 1987 , became known, was not just another day; it was the single worst day (in percentage terms) in the Dow's history and therefore unique. (Estrada, 2009 ).
Indeed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index sustained a 22.6% loss on Black Monday. However, large daily swings that are neither unique, unusual nor as dramatic have a substantial impact on stock market returns. Events such as wars, terrorism, and bankruptcy are known as "black swans". 1 According to Taleb (2007) , a black swan is an event with three attributes: (i) It is an outlier, lying outside the realm of regular expectations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its occurrence; (ii) it carries an extreme impact; and (iii) despite being an outlier, plausible explanations for its occurrence can be found after the fact, thus implying that it is explainable and predictable.
Failing to take explicit account of the fact that such extraordinary movements have occurred in the past -and will occur in the future -is therefore a serious omission (Friedman and Laibson, 1989) . Several studies analyze the financial market reactions to major events, by focusing on one type of event. For example, Schwert (1989b Schwert ( , 1990 ) examine the effect of the 1987 stock market crash, Frey and Kucher (2000) and Choudhry (2010) Other studies purport to identify major shocks due to "unknown" events that affect the stock markets before examining their implications. include the variables in a rare-disaster model to explain the equity premium (Barro, 2006) . Cutler et al. (1989) analyze the fifty largest stock movements in the S&P Composite Stock Index which are defined as the largest one-day returns (daily changes).
Another way to identify black swans or (infrequent) large shocks is intervention analysis, introduced by Box and Tiao (1975) to attempt to statistically appraise these types of shocks. Intervention analysis is used to assess the impact of a known or unknown event on the time series. The main focus is to estimate the dynamic effect of such events on the series. 2 No attempt is made here to formally define a black swan. Intervention analysis forms the basis for many outlier modelling procedures. A number of procedures have been developed to identify these outliers on linear models (e.g., Tsay, 1986; Chang, Tiao and Chen, 1988; Chen and Liu, 1993) . Nevertheless, it is well known that the world is not linear, and neither are financial data. Such extreme movements (in returns) are potentially important in finance and financial economics, especially in modelling volatility of returns, which are an important key to risk management, derivative pricing and hedging, market making, market timing, portfolio selection, monetary policy making, and many other financial activities. Several authors consider outliers in nonlinear setting, especially from autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) models introduced by Engle (1982) and extended to generalized ARCH (GARCH) by Bollerslev (1986) Hotta and Tsay, 2012) . The GARCH models, a well-known time-varying variance specification, have been developed to capture the two most important stylized facts of returns of financial assets, which are heavy-tailed distribution and volatility clustering.
In this paper, the detection and identification of large shocks in volatility of the DJIA index spanning October 2, 1928 to August 30, 2013 results from the semiparametric procedure to detect additive outliers proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and Palm (LLP) (2013) based on the GJR model of Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) that accounts for the so-called leverage effect. 3 We determine when these (positive and negative) large changes in volatility of daily returns occur during the period. We use a moving subsample (10 years) window to take into account the different volatility levels of the DJIA in the detection of the large shocks, namely periods with high volatility and periods with low volatility. This approach allows thus to identify large shocks as extraordinary movements perceived by the investors. The larger changes in percentage have different consequences and perceptions when the market is within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility period or a stable period, 3 Stock returns exhibit some degree of asymmetry in their conditional variances, i.e. that market participants overreact to bad news as compared to good news (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Bollerslev, Chow, and Kroner, 1992) . especially in a context of uncertainty about the future profitability of equities and their risk. We try to associate the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or financial) event that occurred near that date, and many of them seem to be associated with the same event patterns. We find that large shocks in volatility of the DJIA are principally due to major financial crashes (1929, 1987, and 1997-98) , US elections, wars (e.g., Spanish Civil War, World War II, Korean war, and Gulf war), monetary policy during recessions, macroeconomic news and declarations about the economic situation, terrorist attacks, bankruptcy, and regulation. We also find that some negative and positive high returns experienced by the DJIA are not identified as outliers, namely as extraordinary (rare) movements, due to the very high volatility of some periods (see, e.g., Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a) . This can be explained by differing consequences and perceptions of the investors on larger changes in percentage when the market is within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility period or a stable period.
For example, a percentage change of −4% in returns will be not perceived in the same way by the investors when the market is within a high or a low volatility period. This percentage change considered as a significant shock under a low volatility regime may become insignificant under a high volatility regime. Therefore, we use the iterative cumulative sums of squares (ICSS) algorithm proposed by Inclán and Tiao (1994) and improved by Sansó et al. (2004) to identify sudden shifts in volatility of the DJIA. We find different regime changes in volatility (high, medium and low volatility), especially episodes of high volatility occurring in [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1937] [1938] The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology identifying outliers based on a conditional heteroscedasticity model. The empirical framework is discussed in Section 3, along with the events associated with infrequent large shocks in DJIA volatility. Section 4 presents volatility changes in the DJIA. A discussion on outliers and risk management is given in Section 5. The conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
Outlier detection in GJR model
Several studies have showed that financial data may be affected by contaminated observations (Balke and Fomby, 1994; Charles and Darné, 2005) . This type of observations, called outliers, reflects extraordinary, infrequently occurring events or shocks that have important effects on macroeconomic and financial time series. There are several methods for detecting outliers in nonlinear setting, such as the method for additive jumps detection proposed by Franses and Ghijsels (1999) and Franses and van Dijk (2000) . Here we use the semi-parametric procedure to detect additive outliers proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and Palm (LLP) (2013). 4 Their test is similar to the non-parametric tests for jumps proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) and Andersen, Bollerslev, and Dobrev (2007) for daily data. This method allows us to examine the large shocks that affected the DJIA returns.
Consider the returns series r t , which is defined by r t = log P t − log P t−1 , where P t is the observed price at time t, and consider the ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) model
where L is the lag operator, 
where D t−1 = 1 if J t−1 < 0, and 0 otherwise.
Consider the standardized return on day t
The outliers detection rule is as follow
where I(.) is the indicator function, with I t = 1 when an outlier is detected at observation t and 0 otherwise, and k is a suitable critical value. The critical values are defined by 3 Empirical study
Data description
In this section, we examine the DJIA stock market 5 index spanning the October 2, 1928 to August 30, 2013, namely 21,409 observations. We consider the daily closing prices as the daily observations. Throughout the study, returns are calculated as r t = 100 × (log P t − log P t−1 ), with r t the log-return of each day, and P t the index level 5 The DJIA is the most-quoted market indicator in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet, and one of most important indexes of the NYSE. Because of its longevity, it became the first to be quoted by other publications. Besides longevity, two other factors play a role in its widespread popularity: It is understandable to most people, and it reliably indicates the basic market trend. The DJIA is comprised by 30 companies that are all prominent in their industries. The calculation of the DJIA is weighted price rather than market capitalization. The component weightings are therefore affected only by changes in the stock prices, in contrast with other indices (such as Nasdaq 100 and S&P 500), whose weightings are affected by both changes in price and in the number of shares outstanding. Note that the DJIA can not be considered as a benchmark of US stock market due to the fact that the DJIA incorporates a small number of components and is based on large caps. It is more considered as a large caps index. We thank the referee for this comment.
at day t. Figure 1 plots the returns of the DJIA. This approach is justified because the thrust of the study is an investigation of market volatility. Subperiod analysis is also appropriate because stock return data may not exhibit stationary covariance over long periods (see Pagan and Schwert, 1990) . Accordingly, in this study we consider a 10-year rolling window (about 2,500 observations). 6 We apply the identification procedure of additive outliers in a GJR model for the series of returns. 7 Table 1 and Charles and Darné (2005) , that outliers may cause significant skewness.
A brief history of large shocks in DJIA volatility
All detected outliers are given in Tables 1-4 , by timing and t-statistics as well as point and percent changes. A number of outliers is found in the daily DJIA -47 outliers -during the whole period. The probability of a large shock is 0.22%, with 33 negative (70%) and 14 positive (30%) large shocks, suggesting that returns are more affected by negative large shocks than positive large shocks. We also try to associate the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or financial) event that 6 We used different window's lengths and we obtained the same results. 7 We also applied the Bai-Perron test for detecting structural breaks in returns but we found no break.
occurred near that date, presenting the outlier dates in chronological order. 8 In the following subsections, since many of the identified outliers seem to be associated with the same event patterns we discuss the events using a classification of these patterns: financial crises, elections, wars, monetary policy during the recessions, macroeconomic news and declarations on the economic situation, terrorist attacks, bankruptcy and investigation, regulation, and politico-economic conflicts.
Further, Table 7 On June 22, 1931, the DJIA rose to 11.90% which can be attributed to President Herbert Hoover's proposal of a one-year moratorium on $250 billion of war debt owed to the US government by foreign powers. This plan was regarded as the most constructive economic development in two years, and was expected to stabilize international conditions tremendously. A strong rise occurred on October 6, 1931, driven by the noise of the formation of a powerful banking syndicate whose the aim was to repossess some assets immobilized in several large financial institutions (+14.87% for the DJIA). for the DJIA on October 27, 1997. This plunge obliged the NYSE to stop quotations temporarily; it was the first time in US history that these mechanisms, adopted after the crash of 1987, were applied. 12 11 See Schwert (1989b Schwert ( , 1990 ) and Carlson (2006) for a discussion of the 1987 stock market crash. 12 In response to the market crisis of October 1987 the NYSE instituted circuit breakers to reduce The trigger levels for a market-wide trading halt were set at 10%, 20% and 30% of the DJIA, calculated at the beginning of each calendar quarter, using the average closing value of the DJIA for the prior month, thereby establishing specific point values for the quarter.
announcement of his heart attack prompted a plunge in the DJIA (-6.54%) on September 26, 1955 . In the following days, Wall Street responded strongly to major news concerning the President's health: good news on September 27, 1955 (+2.28% for the DJIA) and bad news on October 10, 1955 (-2.92% for the DJIA). 13 The 1982-1990 Expansion. The fall of DJIA (-3.26%) on July 07, 1986, can be explained by a fear on the health of the US economy due to negative factors, primarily weak corporate profits and declines in production, new orders and employment in the industrial sector during June. The DJIA fell by 2.33% on April 14, 1988 , following the announcement of the increase in the US trade deficit in February ($13.8 billion).
The September 11 Terrorist Attacks
The terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 affected stock markets around the world. The US markets remained closed for four days, whereas the European markets decided to remain open but felt the consequences of the terrorist attacks.
The DJIA fell by "only" 7.13% when the US markets reopened on September 17, 2001 . Indeed, the US stock markets were supported by the interventions of the central banks, in particular the Fed 16 and the European Central Bank, which lowered their interest rates, and by technical provisions on the repurchases of shares by companies.
Such provisions are generally used to prevent a stock market crash. Moreover, the authorities intervened to dissuade the banks and trust companies from lending their securities to speculative funds, to discourage short selling transactions, which amplify market plunges.
Bankruptcy
The major banks' rejection of the plan to buy out United Airlines can explain the considerable losses in the DJIA (-6.91%) on October 13, 1989. The crash was apparently caused by a reaction to a news story about the break-down of a $6.75 billion leveraged buy-out deal for United Continental Holdings (UAL) Corporation, the parent 16 The Fed took steps to provide a high level of liquidity ($100 billion) through the US banking and 
Regulation
After an eleven-day interruption due to National Banking holiday, 17 the NYSE reopened on March 15, 1933 , with a strong rise (+15.34% for the DJIA). It seems that the measures adopted by President Franklin Roosevelt to solve the banking crisis and to balance the budget reassured investors, especially the Emergency Banking Act or the Glass-Steagall Act 18 (law to banks from engaging in speculation). These measures placed the market under governmental control, created restrictions on advances that brokers could receive and obliged brokers and the members of Stock Exchange to file daily reports on bank loans. 19 
Miscellaneous
The fall of the DJIA (-3.29%) on announced that they would tighten the criteria for this type of refinancing loans. The US equity markets (-5.55% for DJIA) have fallen quickly in reaction to the Standard & Poor's decision to downgrade the US credit rating from AAA to AA+.
Volatility changes in the DJIA
We find that some negative and positive high returns experienced by the DJIA are not identified as outliers, namely as extraordinary (rare) movements, due to the very high volatility of some periods (see, e.g., Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a 21 Therefore, using the outlier-adjusted DJIA return series, we apply the modified ICSS algorithm to detect sudden changes in volatility.
Sudden change detection
The most popular statistical methods specifically designed to detect breaks in volatility are CUSUM-type tests. As underlined by Rodrigues and Rubia (2011) , the ability 20 Let r i,t = 100 × log(P i,t /P i,t−1 ), where P i,t is the price of the index i at the time t, so that r t is the percent return of the index i from period t − 1 to t. {r t } is then assumed to be a series of independent observations from a normal distribution with zero mean and unconditional variance σ 2 t for t = 1, . . . , T . Assume that the variance within each interval is denoted by σ 2 j , j = 0, 1, . . . , N T , where N T is the total number of variance changes, and 1 < κ 1 < κ 2 < · · · < κ N T < T are the set of breakpoints. Then the variances over the N T intervals are defined as
The cumulative sum of squares is used to estimate the number of variance changes and to detect the point in time of each variance shift. The cumulative sum of the squared observations from the beginning of the series to the kth point in time is expressed as
To test the null hypothesis of constant unconditional variance, the Inclán-Tiao statistic is given by:
where
, with C T is the sum of the squared residuals from the whole sample period. 
, and the lag truncation parameter m is selected using the procedure in Newey and West (1994) . Under general conditions, the asymptotic distribution of AIT statistic is also given by sup r |W * (r)|, and finite-sample critical values can be generated by simulation. 22 Bacmann and Dubois (2002) show that one way to circumvent this problem is by filtering the return series by a GARCH (1,1) model, and applying the ICSS algorithm developed by Inclán and Tiao (1994) to the standardized residuals obtained from the estimation. Fernandez (2006) proposes an alternative approach to testing for variance homogeneity based on wavelet analysis. 23 This adjusted statistic is equivalent to the non-parametric test proposed by Kokoszka and Leipus (2000).
Sudden changes in the DJIA
As suggested by Rodrigues and Rubia (2011), the modified ICSS algorithm proposed by Sansó et al. (2004) is applied on outlier-adjusted returns of DJIA. Table 5 (see also Officer, 1973; Schwert, 1989a Schwert, , 1998 . 25 Voth (2003) 27 VaR quantifies the potential loss for a portfolio of assets (r t ) under normal market condition over a given period of time horizon h with a certain confidence level (1−α), at time t conditionnally on available 28 Estrada (2009) show that a few outliers have a massive impact on long term performance from the 31 Expected shortfall is a coherent measure of risk and it is defined as the expected value of the losses conditional on the loss being larger than the VaR. 32 Hendricks (1996) indicates that two measures can be constructed: (i) the Table 2 show that the risk measures based on outlier-free data are better than those from original data. These results suggest that taking into account the outliers is important for risk managers with respect to risk measure assessment, such as VaR and expected shortfall.
We also compare the different sub-periods with some in-sample risk measures (VaR and ES) under 95% confidence level. Table 6 displays the results and confirms DJIA over the 1900-2006 period. 29 We do not search the best volatility models for computing VaR, but this point will be examined in future research. 30 Our results are not sensitive to the choice of volatility proxy. 31 In the properties a coherent measure functional must satisfy on an appropriate probabilistic space, the sub-additivity property does not hold for all cases. Specific portfolios can be constructed where the risk of a portfolio with two assets can be greater than the sum of the individual risks therefore, violating sub-additivity and in general the diversification principle (Scaillet, 2000) . 32 The expected shortfall is defined as: 33 These results show the relevance of differencing the volatility regimes for risk management.
Another way to estimate the VaR is the extreme value theory (EVT). Indeed the Gaussian method can fail when the return distribution is fat-tailed. The EVT provides statistical tools to estimate the tails of probability distribution. As underlined by Gonzalo and Olmo (2004) , the first task is to identify which values are really extreme.
The authors propose a formal way of identifying and estimating the extreme values of any random sample of size n coming from a distribution function (F) that is to distinguish between extreme returns and outlying returns. They provide accurate approximations of the extreme quantiles of F and show that identification of the real extreme observations allows to estimate a VaR very accurately.
Conclusion
This study examined the kinds of events that cause large shocks, considered as black swans or rare events, in the volatility of the DJIA index between October 2, 1928 and August 30, 2013. More precisely, from the semi-parametric procedure to detect additive outliers proposed by Laurent, Lecourt and Palm (LLP) (2013) based on the GJR model, we determined when these (positive and negative) large changes in volatility of daily returns occur during this period. We also tried to associate the date of each outlier with a specific (economic, political or financial) event that occurred near that date, and many of them seem to be associated with the same event 33 Note that the VaR models for some sub-periods are rejected by the LR Kupiec and DQ tests. The
VaR model is not rejected for the 1937-1938 sub-period but this result should be take with caution due to the bad small sample properties of backtesting tests.
patterns. We found that the large volatility shocks are principally due to the major financial crashes, the US elections, wars, monetary policies during the recessions, macroeconomic news and declarations on the economic situation, terrorist attacks, bankruptcy, and regulation. This finding suggests that these large shocks should be thus taken into account in modelling volatility of returns along with in macro-finance models.
We also showed that some shocks were not identified as extraordinary movements due 
